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The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between  
Mainland China and Hong Kong – Legal and Economic Analyses 





 On 29 June 2003, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (the Mainland) and the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) signed the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA). As the first Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) for both sides, the CEPA provides a model for 
China to use the arrangements allowed under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to further trade 
liberalisation and promote economic development. This is a commendable endeavour. However, due to the 
complexity of the relevant rules of the WTO, caution must be exercised in the formulation and implementation of 
such agreements. This commentary briefly discusses the legal issues raised under the WTO rules as well as the 
possible economic implications of CEPA.  
 
 
I. The CEPA: a general introduction 
I.A. Negotiating history1  
 In 1999, the General Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong (the “Chamber”) conducted a study on how 
important sectors of Hong Kong’s economy can better position themselves after China’s entry to the WTO. The 
final report, titled “China’s Entry into the WTO and its Impact on Hong Kong Business”, was released in January 2000. In 
anticipation of the challenges faced by the Hong Kong companies, the report suggested forming a RTA between the 
Mainland and Hong Kong.   
 
 When the Mainland was poised to finalize its WTO accession process, some small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Hong Kong feared that they would lose their competitive edge over foreign companies once 
China’s market was fully opened up. Thus, they pressed the Mainland and the HKSAR governments for special 
preferential treatment from the Mainland. Such expectation was reinforced by a speech in October 2001 by the 
Beijing Mayor, who would reportedly be “granting special preferential treatment to Hong Kong companies”.2  As 
clarified by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) later, this turned out to be 
misinterpretation of the relevant rules because the WTO rules do not permit such preferential treatment.3  However, 
it is legitimate for Hong Kong to gain some advantage by negotiating a RTA between the Mainland and Hong Kong. 
 
  Thus, after China’s application for WTO membership was accepted at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
Doha on 10 November 2001, the Chamber continued to pursue the concept of a RTA between the two economies. 
On 20 November 2001, the Chamber wrote to HKSAR Chief Executive, and discussed the subject with him at a 
meeting two days later. In December 2001, the Chief Executive obtained the Central Government’s agreement in 
principle to his proposal of establishing a form of free-trade area (FTA) between the Mainland and the HKSAR. 
Consultations began in January 2002. The two sides held a number of High Level and Senior Official meetings over 
the next 18 months, and reached agreement on the main parts of the CEPA in late June 2003. 
 
I.B. Summary of the CEPA 
 The CEPA includes the main text, six annexes and one schedule. It covers three broad areas, namely, trade in 
goods, trade in services, and trade and investment facilitation. 
 
I.B.i. Trade in goods 
 According to Article 5, Hong Kong agrees to maintain its existing zero import tariff regime with respect to 
all goods of Mainland origin. In return, the Mainland agrees to apply zero import tariff from 1 January 2004 for 
*  LLM, London; JD, Vanderbilt; Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong, formerly with the WTO 
Appellate Body Secretariat and the Trade in Services Division of the WTO Secretariat. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Donald Clark for his valuable comments. 
1   For detailed history, please refer to Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Mainland China / Hong Kong Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement: Business Assessment, November 2003, pp. 3-6. 
2  South China Morning Post, Beijing boosts SAR firms, 24 October 2001. 
3  South China Morning Post, Special privileges for firms denied, 31 October 2001. 
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exports from Hong Kong meeting the rules of origin requirement in 273 Mainland product codes4, including 
electrical and electronic products, plastic articles, paper articles, textiles and clothing, chemical products, 
pharmaceutical products, clocks and watches, jewellery, cosmetics, metal products and some other miscellaneous 
products. The Mainland also agrees to apply zero import tariff no later than 1 January 2006 upon applications by 
Hong Kong manufacturers for other product codes maintained on China’s tariff system and meeting the CEPA 
rules of origin. 
 
 Article 10 and Annex 2 set out the Rules of Origin under CEPA. According to Annex 2, if certain goods are 
wholly obtained in one side, they are regarded as originating in that side; if the goods are not wholly obtained in one 
side, then they will be regarded as originating in that side only if it has undergone substantial transformation in that 
side. If goods fall under one of the categories of Article 3 of Annex 2 and the processing treatment has been 
minimal as under Article 4 of Annex 2, then it will be regarded as wholly obtained from that side. As for goods 
partially obtained from one side, there are several possible criteria for determining whether they undergo 
“substantial transformation”: manufacturing or processing operations, change in tariff heading (CTH), value-added 
content, other criteria or mixed criteria. Among the 273 product codes, sixty eight percent (187) will keep the 
existing origin rules in Hong Kong. These items include textiles and clothing, jewellery, cosmetics, pharmaceutical 
products, and plastic and paper articles. Seventeen percent (46) of the products (i.e. some chemical and metal 
products, some electronic products and electronic components) will use the CTH approach as the CEPA origin 
rules. The CTH approach is an approach widely used by most WTO members. The remaining fifteen percent (40) 
products (i.e. some electronic and optical components, watches and clocks, and watch movements) will adopt a 30% 
value-added requirement as the CEPA origin rules. 
 
  According to Articles 6, 7, and 8, the two sides agree not to take anti-dumping, countervailing and any WTO-
inconsistent non-tariff measures against goods originated from the other side. At the same time, the Mainland agrees 
not to apply tariff rate quotas against goods of Hong Kong origin. However, under Article 9, each side can still take 
safeguard measures when certain conditions are met. 
 
  Under Article 4, the two sides have also recognized that Mainland now has a market economy and agreed 
that certain discriminatory treatment provisions in China’s Accession Protocol will not be applicable to the trade 
between the Mainland and Hong Kong. Among these are the alternative non-market economy methodology used in 
antidumping cases and the alternative benchmark methodology in subsidies cases (Article 15 of China’s Accession 
Protocol); the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism (Article 16 of China’s Accession Protocol); and the 
special textile safeguard (paragraph 242 of China’s Accession Working Party Report). Considering that Hong Kong 
is unlikely to apply these rules against goods of Mainland origin even without such an explicit mandate in the CEPA, 
this provision seems to be of more symbolic than practical significance. However, if applied well, this article could 
have strategic significance as well. Should China include similar provisions acknowledging its market economy status 
in the future FTA agreements with Macau, ASEAN members, and some other major trade partners, then it would 
be easier for China to establish its market economy status in anti-dumping and subsidies cases brought in countries 
that are not members of such FTAs. As to the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism and the special 
textile safeguard, the same provision can help China to divert its exports to those countries that have agreed not to 
apply these safeguards from the countries that will apply them. 
 
I.B.ii. Trade in services 
  According to Article 11 and Annex 4, the Mainland agrees, starting from 1 October 2003, to grant market 
access concessions to value-added telecommunication services from Hong Kong; and, starting from 1 January 2004, 
to grant market access concessions to Hong Kong services and services providers in the following sectors: 
professional services (including legal, accounting, architectural, engineering, medical and dental services), real estate 
services, advertising services, management consulting services, convention and exhibition services, audio-visual 
services, construction and related engineering services, distribution services (including commission agents’ services, 
wholesale trade services, retailing and franchising), financial services (including insurance, banking and securities), 
tourism and travel related services, transport services, logistics services.  
 
 The definition of “service suppliers” is provided for in Article 12 and Annex 5. Generally, the term refers to 
any person that supplies a service. “Person”, in turn, includes both natural person and juridical person. Natural 
person means a citizen of the Mainland or a permanent resident of Hong Kong. Juridical person means any legal 
entity duly constituted under the applicable laws of either side and engages in substantive business operations in 
such side. 
 
4  The Ministry of Finance of China revises the product codes every year. According to the new rules effective from January 1, 
2004, Hong Kong goods under 374 product codes will enjoy zero tariff. See Southern Daily, Goods under 374 product codes from 
Hong Kong will enjoy “zero tariff” in 2004, 2 January 2004. 
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The commitments for trade in services vary for each sector. Broadly speaking, the liberalisation permits 
earlier access to Hong Kong companies and services providers to the Mainland market, ahead of China’s WTO 
timetable. In some sectors, such as construction and real estate services, logistics services, transport services, 
distribution services, legal services, and audio-visual services, the concessions extend beyond China’s WTO 
commitments. Also, unless positively exceeded by the concessions stipulated in the CEPA, China’s WTO 
commitments, including both concessions and limitations, for each individual services sector, continue to apply. 
 
In addition, according to Articles 13 and 14, the two sides specifically agree to further strengthen their 
cooperation on financial services and tourism.  They also agree, under Article 15, to encourage mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications.  
 
Also, Hong Kong agrees to bind its existing services regime for, and undertake not to introduce new 
discriminatory measures against, services and services suppliers of the Mainland for those sectors covered in the 
CEPA. This is less than the concessions offered by the Mainland, but exceeds Hong Kong’s commitments under 
the WTO. Moreover, considering that the existing regime on trade in services in Hong Kong is already more liberal 
than that of the Mainland, this commitment is still substantial.  
 
I.B.iii. Trade and investment facilitation 
 According to Article 17 and Annex 6, the two sides will promote cooperation in seven areas, i.e., trade and 
investment promotion; customs clearance facilitation; commodity inspection and quarantine, food safety, quality and 
standardization; electronic business; transparency in laws and regulations; cooperation of small and medium 




II. The Legal status of the CEPA under the WTO rules 
 The CEPA, as with all RTAs, constitute a derogation of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of the 
WTO. Described as the cornerstone of the international trade rules embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), the MFN principle mandates that any advantage granted by any contracting party to products of 
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product of all other contracting 
parties (GATT: Article I). Thus, when a WTO member enters into a RTA through which it grants more favourable 
conditions to its trade with parties to that arrangement than to the trade with other WTO members, it departs from 
this principle. 
 
 The WTO, however, recognizes “the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through 
voluntary arrangements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements” 
(GATT: Article XXIV). Thus, Members are permitted to enter into such arrangements under specific conditions 
which are spelled out in three sets of rules:  
 
Article XXIV of GATT, as clarified in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1994 (the 1994 Understanding), provides for the formation and operation of RTAs covering trade 
in goods;  
 
The so-called Enabling Clause (i.e., the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries) refers to preferential trade arrangements in 
trade in goods between developing country Members;5 and 
 
Article V of GATS governs the conclusion of Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) in the area of 
trade in services, for both developed and developing countries.  
 
 According to GATT Article XXIV:8, there are two types of RTAs: Customs Union & FTA. The same 
paragraph also provides for definitions of the two arrangements: 
 
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more 
customs territories, so that 
5  Each Member elects whether it is a developing or developed country when it joins the WTO. Hong Kong elects to be a 
developing country notwithstanding its high per capita GDP. However, according to trade sources, the CEPA would unlikely 
be notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause. Thus, this article will not discuss the implications of the Enabling 
Clause.  
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  (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in 
products originating in such territories, and, 
  (ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other regulations of 
commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the 
union; 
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles 
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories 
in products originating in such territories. 
 
Thus, judged from its terms, the CEPA is an FTA rather than a customs union because it does not mandate China 
and Hong Kong to apply uniform duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce to territories not included in 
the CEPA. 
   
 Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also provides for the establishment of 
EIAs covering trade in services. Thus, the CEPA is also an EIA because it also covers trade in services. 
  
 To prevent an RTA from being used as a disguise for discrimination against non-members to the agreement, 
the relevant GATT and GATS provisions also set out detailed substantive and procedural requirements for the 
formation and operation of RTAs and EIAs.  
 
II.A. Substantial Requirements  
II.A.i. Requirements under the GATT:  
II.A.i.a. The “Deep Integration” requirement: Duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce shall be eliminated on substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories. 
 It is unclear what is the real meaning of the expression “substantially all the trade”. There have been two 
major interpretations on the requirement, not mutually exclusive, in that respect: 
 
(i)  A quantitative approach favours the definition of a statistical benchmark, such as a certain percentage of the trade between 
RTA parties, to indicate that the coverage of a given RTA fulfils the requirement.6
(ii)  A qualitative approach sees the requirement as meaning that no sector (or at least no major sector) is to be kept out of intra-
RTA trade liberalization; this approach aims at preventing the exclusion from RTA liberalization of any sector where the 
restrictive policies in place before the formation of the RTA hindered trade, which could well be the case if a quantitative 
approach was used.7
 To clarify the meaning, the preamble of the 1994 Understanding recognizes “that [the contribution to the 
expansion of world trade made by closer integration between the economies of the parties to such agreements] is 
increased if the elimination between the constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded”.  
 
  The Appellate Body, in the Turkey-Textiles case, also visited the issue. According to the Appellate Body, the 
expression “substantially all the trade” “is something considerably more than merely some of the trade”, but “is not 
the same as all the trade”.8 This still falls short of establishing a clear guideline. 
 
  The 273 items under the CEPA represent 67% of Hong Kong’s total goods export to China in 2001. 
Moreover, combined with the commitments China made in its WTO accession protocol, the products covered will 
represent more than 90% of the total Hong Kong export to China. In addition, the CEPA covers all products 
originating in the Mainland. Thus, it probably satisfies the “substantially all the trade” requirement. 
6  See e.g., The Report of the Sub-group of the Committee on the “European Economic Community”, which proposed that “a free-
trade area should be considered as having been achieved for substantially all the trade when the volume of liberalized trade 
reached 80 per cent of total trade”, GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (BISD), 6S/70, 99, para. 30. 
7  See e.g., The Report of the Working Party on the “European Free Trade Area - Examination of the Stockholm Convention”, which 
noted that the exclusion of a whole sector (such as agriculture) might disqualify the FTA even if such sector only constitute 
a small share of the total trade, GATT BISD, 9S/70, 83-85, paras. 48-49, 51, 54. 
8  Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products ("Turkey–Textiles "), WT/DS34/AB/R, 
adopted 19 November 1999, DSR 1999:VI, 2345, para. 48. 
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II.A.i.b. The “Neutrality” requirement: The duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories 
and applicable at the formation of such FTA to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement 
shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent 
territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area. 
 In practice, third countries might be adversely affected when an FTA brings about different ways to design 
and administer the rules of origin. As mentioned above, because most of the current rules of origin will remain the 
same, it is unlikely that the new rules will adversely affect third countries.  
 
II.A.ii. Requirements under the GATS:  
 According to GATS Article V, the EIA9 shall have substantial sectoral coverage, and provides for the 
absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in the sense of GATS Article XVII, between or among the 
parties, in the sectors covered in the EIA, through: 
 
(a) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(b) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, 
 
either at the entry into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except for measures 
permitted under GATS Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis. 
 
  Under the CEPA, Mainland agrees to progressively reduce or eliminate existing restrictive measures against 
services and service suppliers of Hong Kong; at the same time, Hong Kong agrees not to impose any new 
discriminatory measures on the Mainland’s service and service providers for the same sectors. Thus, the CEPA 
probably satisfies the trade liberalization requirement.     
 
 With respect to “substantial sectoral coverage”, the footnote to GATS Article V:1(a) states that this 
condition “is understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply”. Also, the 
same footnote provides that “in order to meet this condition, agreements should not provide for the a priori 
exclusion of any mode of supply”.   
 
  Regarding the coverage of sectors, there exist two major interpretations on the requirement:  
 
(a) Not all sectors must be covered under an EIA.  
(b) The flexibility provided by the word “substantial” does not allow for the exclusion of a sector from an EIA.  That has also been 
modulated by a suggestion that the exclusion of essential services (those which serve as infrastructure for economic activity, such 
as transportation) could not be possible and that the exclusion of major service sectors needed to be considered in conjunction 
with the modes of supply and the volume of trade involved.  
 
 Of the 12 sectors listed in the WTO Services Sectoral Classification List, the CEPA fully liberalizes 5 sectors 
(construction and related engineering services; distribution services; financial services; tourism and travel related 
services; and transport services), and partially liberalizes two sectors (business services and communication services). 
Generally speaking, these sectors are the ones that Hong Kong companies have comparative advantages. They are 
also among the sectors that are included in China’s GATS schedule. For some other sectors (e.g. educational 
services and environmental services) and sub-sectors (e.g. computer and related services) where Hong Kong 
companies have comparative advantages, the CEPA does not offer additional liberalisation on top of China’s 
commitments in its schedule. However, the commitments under the CEPA, when read together with the respective 
commitments of the two sides in its WTO schedule, are very substantial. Also, Articles 1 and 11 of CEPA provide a 
process of continuous liberalization between the two economies. Most importantly, the CEPA, even in its current 
format, provides more substantial coverage than many existing EIAs, which usually cover only financial services, 
telecommunications and professional services. As none of these EIAs has been found to fail to meet the 
requirements of EIA, the CEPA will probably be eligible as an EIA as well. 
 
  Regarding the coverage of modes of supply, it has been argued that an EIA must include all modes of supply 
in order to comply with the requirements under GATS Article V:1(a);  in particular, no EIA should a priori exclude 
investment and labour mobility in the sense of Modes 3 and 4. Under its terms, the CEPA does not exclude any 
modes of supply from its coverage. 
 
  Overall, the CEPA could arguably meet the requirement of an EIA under GATS Article V.  
 
9  This is the equivalent of FTA in trade in services. 
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II.B. Procedural Requirements 
 There are several procedural obligations under both the GATT and GATS: 
 
II.B.i. Notification:  
 GATT Art. XXIV:7(a) requires that any contracting party deciding to enter into RTA shall “promptly notify 
the Contracting Parties and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as 
will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate”. 
According to the 1994 Understanding, the members of an RTA shall also report any significant changes or 
developments in the agreement as they occur. However, neither provision specifies how “prompt” such notification 
shall be. In fact, a number of RTAs currently in force have not been notified to the WTO, in particular preferential 
arrangements between developing countries.  Neither does it specify the format of such notification. In practice, the 
notification is expected to indicate the parties to the arrangement, the coverage of the agreement, whether it is a 
free-trade area or a customs union or an interim agreement. A copy of the Treaty or Agreement between the parties 
must be annexed to the Notification. In principle, the notification should be inscribed on the agenda of the Council 
for Trade in Goods at least ten days before its first meeting following signature of the agreement. However, given 
that most RTAs are notified after their entry into force, the current practice is for the Council for Trade in Goods to 
put the notification on its agenda for the meeting immediately following that notification.   
 
  Similarly, GATS Art. V:7(a) requires that Members to such agreement “shall promptly notify any such 
agreement and any enlargement or any significant modification of that agreement to the Council for Trade in 
Services. They shall also make available to the Council such relevant information as may be requested by it.” 
However, it does not specify the time-frame for or the format of such notification either.  
 
II.B.ii. Examination:  
 According to the 1994 Understanding, all notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be 
examined by a working party in the light of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of the 1994 
Understanding. Similarly, under GATS Art. V:7(a) & (c), after the notification, the Council for Trade in Services 
may establish a working party to examine the notifications made under the respective agreements and report to the 
Council on its consistency with GATS Art. V. The working party shall submit a report to the respective Councils 
afterwards. Based on such report, the respective Councils may make such recommendations to Members as it deems 
appropriate. 
 
II.B.iii. Periodic Review:  
 According to the 1994 Understanding and the instructions of the Contracting Parties to GATT 1947 in 1971, 
constituents of an RTA shall report every two years to the Council for Trade in Goods on the operation of the 
relevant agreement.  
 
  According to GATS Art. V:7(b) & (c), Members which are parties to any agreement which is implemented 
on the basis of a time-frame shall report periodically to the Council for Trade in Services on its implementation. The 
Council may establish a working party to examine such reports if it deems such a working party necessary. Based on 
the reports of the working parties, the Council may make recommendations to the parties as it deems appropriate. 
This means that, if the agreement is not implemented in stages, there is no obligation to make periodic reports.  
 
 
III. How to comply with the Procedural Requirements? 
 As noted above, RTAs are subject to the notification and examination requirements under the GATT and 
GATS. In order to streamline the process, the General Council of the WTO agreed in February 1996 to establish 
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA).  Among the terms of reference of the CRTA are the 
examination of regional trade agreements; to consider and make recommendations on the requirement for reporting 
on their operation; the development of procedures to facilitate and improve the examination process; and 
consideration of the systemic implications of such agreements and regional initiatives for the multilateral trading 
system and the relationship between them. 
 
  The establishment of the Committee does not have any implications for the notification obligations of 
Members.  All notifications would be examined by the appropriate body, i.e., the Council for Trade in Goods, the 
Council for Trade in Services and the Committee on Trade and Development.  The Committee would only examine 
agreements referred to it by any of these three bodies.    
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  To facilitate the examination process, the CRTA has developed a standard format to be used by Members 
when notifying their Agreements to the WTO. Note that this format is not mandatory; rather, parties adhere to the 
requirements of the Standard Format on a voluntary basis only. According to the standard format, the Members are 




IV. Further Issues of Concern 
IV.A. Potential legal challenges at the WTO 
 
 While WTO rules provide for a multilateral assessment of the consistency of an RTA with the rules, the 
possibility of recourse to dispute settlement is explicitly referred to in paragraph 12 of the 1994 Understanding: 
 
 “Dispute Settlement 
 
 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those 
provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the 
formation of a customs union or free-trade area.” 
 
As to the burden of proof, the Panel stated in the Turkey–Textiles case that “it is for the party invoking an 
exception or an affirmative defense to prove that the conditions contained therein are met”, i.e., the parties to the 
FTA bears the burden of proving the agreement satisfies the WTO requirements. 
 
 There could be two kinds of challenges under CEPA: 
 
 First, One side might sue the other claiming that some provisions lead to diminution of the rights that the 
former enjoys under the WTO rules in relation to their trade with each other. Two provisions in the CEPA could 
cause such problems. One is Article 19, which requires the parties to submit disputes arising on the interpretation 
and implementation of CEPA to the Steering Committee. This could provide the opportunity for one party to 
intimidate the other by abusing its economic power. The other is Article 10 and Annex 2 on the rules of origin. 
Because CEPA gives Hong Kong products greater benefits, China might need to tighten its current rules of origin 
for Hong Kong products in order to prevent products from other countries to take advantage of this clause. This 
might harm legitimate Hong Kong-made products that qualify under the current rules of origin, but might not under 
the new rules. This will violate China’s commitment in Paragraph 7 of its WTO Accession Protocol not to introduce 
any new non-tariff barriers. However, according to our prior analysis, of the 273 product codes covered, 68% (187) 
will keep the existing origin rules in Hong Kong; while another 17% (46) of the products will use the CTH approach, 
which is widely-used by most WTO members. Thus, these rules are unlikely to be challenged as inconsistent with 
WTO rules. As to the remaining 15% (40) which adopt a value-added requirement, the 30% requirement under 
CEPA is much lower than the usual 40% (e.g. Chile–Columbia FTA) to 60% (e.g. Mercosur10) requirements in 
similar agreements. Thus, this requirement probably will not violate the WTO rules.  Moreover, for political 
considerations, neither China nor Hong Kong is likely to bring any disputes between them to the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
 
  Second, a third party might sue both parties to CEPA. There are two possible sources for dispute here. First, 
the third party could claim that the CEPA does not qualify under either the substantive or procedural provisions for 
RTA, or both, and thus violates the MFN principle. However, according to the prior analysis, such dispute is 
unlikely to occur. Second, due to the change in the rules of origin, products from third countries could lose the 
benefits they enjoy under the old rules. This could bring potential complaint claiming that China violates its 
commitment in Paragraph 7 of its WTO Accession Protocol not to introduce any new non-tariff barriers. This is a 
real problem that China must consider seriously. 
   
IV.B. Economic implications of CEPA 
 
IV.B.i. Trade in Goods 
 
 In terms of the benefits for trade in goods, the Hong Kong Trade Development Council has estimated that 
HONG KONG companies will save some 750 million HKD in tariff on the first batch of products that enjoy zero-
10  MERCOSUR, Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South) is a customs union established in November 29, 
1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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tariff rates from January 1st 2004.11 This is unlikely to bring any significant benefits to the Hong Kong economy as it 
is only less than half a percentage of Hong Kong’s direct investment in China, which was 140 billion HKD in 
2002.12  Worse still, it turned out that the real tariff savings may well be even less than the estimate. According to a 
report by Ming Pao, a local Hong Kong newspaper, the total value of Hong Kong products that qualifies for zero-
tariff under CEPA for the first half of 2004 is only 470 million HKD.13 China’s bound tariff rates for these products 
ranging from 3% to 35%.14 Thus, even assuming the highest tariff applicable to all products, the tariff savings are 
only 164.5 million HKD. There are several reasons for the discrepancies. First, amongst the products covered under 
CEPA, 70% are not for domestic consumption in China at all. 15  Instead, they are sent to China for further 
processing and then exported to third countries. Even under the pre-CEPA customs regulations in China, no tariff 
is required. Thus, there will be no tariff savings either. Second, the costs associated with applying for the certificate 
of origin are prohibitive.16 The cost of the certificate of origin is only 324 HKD17, but in order to prepare the 
documents required to apply for the certificate of origin, one has to pay substantial amounts to the accountants, 
auditors and lawyers. According to the Chief Advisor to the Hong Kong Watch Manufacturers Association, CEPA 
can save 10,000 HKD in tariff on a cargo worth 100,000 HKD; the auditing fee for the financial records, however, 
can be anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000 HKD.18 Third, even though CEPA provides a discounted ticket into the 
huge 1.3 billion market of China, for many small and medium size firms, the promotional expenses for gaining a 
foothold and building a brand name in China could make it commercially unviable for them to explore the 
opportunity.19 Fourth, it might simply take some time for firms to realize the business opportunity under CEPA and 
adjust their strategies accordingly. 
 
IV.B.ii. Trade in Services 
 
 The story is a little bit different for trade in services. As a service-dominated economy20, Hong Kong has 
more comparative advantages over the Mainland in the service sector. As a matter of fact, service was the major 
concern when the Chamber submitted its wish list to the Chief Executive.21 Up until 31 July 2004, the Hong Kong 
authorities approved 405 applications for certificate for “Hong Kong company”, with transportation and logistics 
companies accounting for more than half.22 Service providers face many of the same problems as those on trade in 
goods, such as costs associated with applying for the certificate for “Hong Kong company”, getting familiar with the 
CEPA provisions to capture more benefits, etc. One thing that is different for services, however, is that the 
investment patterns of Hong Kong companies might see some positive changes due to CEPA. First, under the 
foreign investment laws of China, for many sectors, foreign companies (including Hong Kong companies) can only 
investment through various forms of joint ventures (JVs). If a Hong Kong company is unable to find a suitable 
Chinese partner, it might well decide not to invest at all. CEPA, however, allows Hong Kong companies to 
investment in Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises (WFOEs). Therefore, more Hong Kong companies might choose 
to invest in the form of WFOEs rather than JVs. As they no longer have to take the trouble of finding a Chinese 
partner, this might help increase the volume of the direct investment as well. CEPA also lowers the threshold for 
many sectors. This will make it easier for Hong Kong SMEs to invest in China, and could well translate into more 
direct investments as well. 
 
 
11  Hong Kong Trade Development Council, CEPA and Opportunities for Hong Kong, available at  
http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/tdc/tdc031002.htm, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
12  Ministry of Commerce of China, Statistics on Hong Kong’s Investment in China, available at 
http://hk.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200311/20031100143899_1.xml, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
13  Ming Pao, 750 Million Tariff Savings Miscalculated, July 12, 2004, Monday, p. A07. 
14  Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Topical Issues, summary of Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, Trade in Goods, 
available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/summary_goods.html, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
15  Ming Pao, supra, footnote 13. 
16  Studies have generally shown that exporters may choose to forgo the preferential rates offered under an RTA, if the margin 
of preference is not large enough to offset the administrative burden of complying with the rules. See, e.g., Danielle 
Goldfarb, "The Road to a Canada-U.S. Customs Union", C.D. Howe Institute, No. 184, June 2003, pp. 7-13, available at 
www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_184.pdf, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
17  Along with an annual factory registration fee of 3,003 HKD, available at 
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/fee/fee.html, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
18  Ming Pao, supra, footnote 13. 
19  Ibid. 
20  According to the Hong Kong government, in 2002, services generated 88% of Hong Kong’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). See e.g., Information Services Department of Hong Kong, Hong Kong as a Service Economy, available at 
www.info.gov.hk/hkfacts/servecon.pdf, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
21  Based on the talk given by Dr Eden Woon, CEO of the Chamber, at the Presentation and Reception by the Commerce for 
the WTO-HKU Regional Trade Policy Course in the Asia Pacific on August 17 2004.  
22  Trade and Industry Department of Hong Kong, CEPA: Statistics on Application for Certificate of Hong Kong Service Supplier (as of 
31 July 2004), available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/hkss_statistics.html, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
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IV.B.iii. Can CEPA Save the Hong Kong Economy? 
 
 Historically, Hong Kong’s rise as an economic power has been driven primarily because China was closed to 
the rest of the world and Hong Kong provided the perfect gateway for foreign products to get into China and 
Chinese export to the rest of the world. Since China adopted the open-door policy in the late 70s, Hong Kong’s 
advantage gradually faded away. With China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997, China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, and the SARS breakout in 2003, Hong Kong has been losing more and more of its 
competing edge. There are three major problems facing the Hong Kong economy, and CEPA is unlikely to solve 
those problems. The first problem is unemployment. According to the Chamber, CEPA will help create 4,500-9,000 
manufacturing jobs23, but this accounts for only 1.6-3% of the unemployment figure of 277,200 in 200324 and thus 
will be of little help. In the services sector, not many new jobs will be created either, with the exception of tourism 
services. This is because under CEPA, most of the service providers can reap the benefits only if they supply the 
service through modes 3 (commercial presence) or 4 (presence of natural persons) rather than mode 1 (cross-border 
supply). The second problem is high fiscal deficit. The main revenue source for Hong Kong is tax, but the surge in 
the tiny manufacturing sector is unlikely to bring in much tax. For the more lucrative service sector, most of the tax 
will probably be paid to Mainland rather than Hong Kong, again because the service suppliers have to go up north 
to sell their service. The third problem is the economic restructuring of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government 
aims to turn its economy into a high-value-added “knowledge economy”, but CEPA is unlikely to help achieve this 
goal either. The reason is same as mentioned above: sector with low knowledge input, such as manufacturing, will be 
encouraged to stay in Hong Kong to enjoy the tariff savings; while sector with high knowledge input, such as most 
service sectors, will have to go to the Mainland in order to capitalize on the business opportunity.  
 
 Even if CEPA could do magic to Hong Kong’s economy, the “CEPA effect” can not last very long. 
According to China’s WTO commitments, within 4-5 years after China’s accession, tariff on goods will be further 
reduced, while in services trade, most of the sectors will be opened up to all WTO members. Of course, the zero-
tariff will only be available for Hong Kong companies. However, as the analysis above shows, this would not have 
much economic significance. The more important is the services commitments. CEPA lowers the threshold for 
Hong Kong service providers, and let them have a first-mover advantage. After two or three years, however, when 
the big and powerful multinationals come in, the SMEs from Hong Kong can barely compete with them. Hong 
Kong companies, especially SMEs, must develop some better competition strategies to better prepare for the 
challenges ahead. 
 
IV.C. A Model for the Future? 
 
 Shortly after Mainland-Hong Kong CEPA was signed, another CEPA was signed between the Mainland and 
Macao in October and took effect on January 1, 2004. Both the main text and the annexes are virtually mirror 
images of the ones with Hong Kong, and one can’t help wondering how much of Macao’s different economic 
structure has been taken into account and thus, how much Macao can benefit from this arrangement. For trade in 
goods, Macao does not produce many of the products on the zero-tariff list at all. For trade in services, Macao does 
not enjoy significant competitive advantages in many sectors on the list either. Also, the gaming sector -- the service 
sector that is most important in Macao’s economy – was not included in the 18 sectors listed.  
 
 It has also been suggested that the CEPA be extended to Taiwan, but it is doubtful that serious discussions 
will ensue any time soon with the political tensions between the two sides. It is no secrete that political 
considerations often dominate RTA talks25, but the political considerations of the two sides might be very different. 
The Mainland might well decide to sacrifice its economic interest in offering better deals to Taiwan, so as to pave 
the road to peaceful reunification with deeper economic integration. The Taiwan authorities, however, consider it 
“very strange to do business with a market that does not recognize the permanent existence of Taiwan”26. Politically, 
the Mainland has always regarded Taiwan as a province, rather than as an independent state or special administrative 
region, which would possess full autonomy in handling its trade relationships. Under the trade and investment 
regimes of the Mainland, however, Taiwan is treated in the same way as any foreign country for all practical 
23     The Chamber, CEPA Zero Tariffs May Create up to 9,000 Manufacturing Jobs, available at 
http://www.chamber.org.hk/wto/content/redirect_cepa_pr.asp?url=http://www.chamber.org.hk/wto/content/CEPA%2
0jobs%20Press%20Release.doc, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
24  Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong, Statistics on Labour Force, Unemployment and Underemployment, available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/labour/ghs/labour1_index.html, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
25  See, e.g., Regional Trade Agreements Section, Trade Policies Review Division, WTO Secretariat, The Changing Landscape of 
RTAs, Seminar on Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO held at the WTO Secretariat, Geneva, 14 November 2003, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/sem_nov03_e/boonekamp_paper_e.doc, last checked on 23 
August 2004. 
26  Mr. Yen Ching-chang, Taiwan’s Permanent Representative to the WTO, Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan in the Context of 
the WTO, address given at the Taiwan WTO Center on 31 May 2004, available at 
http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/do/www/readDoc?document_id=21993, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
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purposes. Furthermore, after both the Mainland and Taiwan acceded to the WTO, the Mainland may no longer 
offer better treatments to Taiwan products and companies as it would violate the MFN obligation. Currently, the 
Mainland does not maintain restrictions on trade with Taiwan, but Taiwan, for political reasons, still prohibits direct 
trade with China.27 Thus, at a time when the Mainland is still denied normal trade relationship with Taiwan, it is 
impossible for the Mainland to ask for preferential trade relationship. Also, Taiwan has a much bigger economy than 
Hong Kong and Macao, and also a much different economic structure with a strong manufacturing sector. Thus, 
even if, assuming political hurdles can be overcome, the negotiations for the Mainland-Taiwan CEPA will be much 
harder than the ones the Mainland had with Hong Kong and Macao.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the CEPA probably satisfies the substantial requirements for both the RTA under the GATT 
and the EIA under the GATS. Thus, it probably will be permitted under the WTO rules. From the economic 
perspective, however, the CEPA might not offer a promising solution to the problems facing the Hong Kong 
economy. 
 
27  See e.g., Article 35 of the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (which permits trade 
between Taiwan and Mainland upon authorization by Taiwan authorities), and Article 5 of the Rules Permitting the Trade 
between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (which permits trade between Taiwan and Mainland but the cargo cannot be 
transported directly between the two sides), available at the website of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan at 
http://www.mac.gov.tw, last checked on 23 August 2004. 
